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PEACEMAKING: THE BROTHER OF  
PEACEKEEPING OR A COMBAT  
OPERATION?

A Monograph  
by

Major Michael D. Barbero  
Infantry



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School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

First Term AY 88-89

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

|  |       |  |  |   |                                |
|--|-------|--|--|---|--------------------------------|
| 1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION<br>UNCLASSIFIED   |       |  | 1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS   |   |                                |
| 2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY  |       |  | 3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT<br>Approved for public release;<br>distribution unlimited |   |                                |
| 2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE  |       |  | 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)  |   |                                |
| 4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)  |       |  | 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION  |   |                                |
| 6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION<br>School of Advanced Military<br>Studies, USAC&GSC  |       | 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL<br>(If applicable)<br>ATZL-SWV | 7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)  |   |                                |
| 6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)<br>Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66021-6900   |       |  | 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER  |   |                                |
| 8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING<br>ORGANIZATION   |       | 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL<br>(If applicable)             | 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS  |   |                                |
| 8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)  |       | PROGRAM<br>ELEMENT NO.                           | PROJECT<br>NO.   | TASK<br>NO.                                     | WORK UNIT<br>ACCESSION NO.     |
| 11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Peacemaking: Brother of Peacekeeping or A Combat<br>Operation (U)  |       |  |  |   |                                |
| 12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) MAJ Michael D. Barbero, USA   |       |  |  |   |                                |
| 13a. TYPE OF REPORT<br>Monograph   |       | 13b. TIME COVERED<br>FROM _____ TO _____         |  | 14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)<br>89/2/7 |                                |
| 15. PAGE COUNT<br>47   |       |  |  |   |                                |
| 16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION   |       |  |  |   |                                |
| 17. COSATI CODES   |       |  | 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)                  |   |                                |
| FIELD  | GROUP | SUB-GROUP  | Peacekeeping Intervention  |   |                                |
|  |       |  | Peacemaking MFO  |   |                                |
|  |       |  | MNF  |   |                                |
| 19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)   |       |  |  |   |                                |
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| 20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT<br><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS   |       |  | 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION<br>UNCLASSIFIED   |   |                                |
| 22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL<br>MAJ Michael D. Barbero  |       |  | 22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)<br>(913) 684-2138   |   | 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL<br>ATZL-SWV |

19. cont.

perience in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and in Lebanon in 1958 and 1982-84 provide the basis for the analysis of peacemaking operations. Once the two operations have been analyzed, a determination of the compatibility of peacemaking and peacekeeping is made.

The conclusion of this study is that the two operations are fundamentally different. And, therefore, it would be dangerous to expect a tactical commander to transition from one operation to the other successfully.

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The Brother of Peacekeeping Or A Combat Operation?

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7 February 1989

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School of Advanced Military Studies  
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Accepted this 16th day of December 1988.

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|--------------------|--|
| Accession For      |  |
| NTIS GRA&I         | <input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/> |
| DTIC TAB           | <input type="checkbox"/>                   |
| Unannounced        | <input type="checkbox"/>                   |
| Justification      |  |
| By                 |  |
| Distribution/      |  |
| Availability Codes |  |
| Dist               | Avail and/or<br>Special                    |
| A-1                |  |

## ABSTRACT

PEACEMAKING: BROTHER OF PEACEKEEPING OR A COMBAT OPERATION?  
by Major Michael D. Barbero, USA, 47 pages.

This paper analyzes the doctrinal relationship between peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. Since WWII we have witnessed a rise in the frequency of "Low-Intensity Conflicts"(LIC). Two types of operations conducted in response to this type of conflict are Peacekeeping and Peacemaking operations. Current Army doctrine for LIC, as outlined in FM 100-20, implies that while peacemaking is essentially a combat operation, a strong relationship exists between peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. And peacemaking operations can successfully transition to peacekeeping.

This paper begins with an analysis of the moral, cybernetic and physical domains of peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to determine the true nature of each operation. The U.N. Model and the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) serve as the basis for the analysis of peacekeeping. And the U.S. experience in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and in Lebanon in 1958 and 1982-84 provide the basis for the analysis of peacemaking operations. Once the two operations have been analyzed, a determination of the compatibility of peacemaking and peacekeeping is made.

The conclusion of this study is that the two operations are fundamentally different. And, therefore, it would be dangerous to expect a tactical commander to transition from one operation to the other successfully.

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## I INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, the effects of the disintegration of colonial empires and the concomitant rise of nationalism have produced a variety of political, social and economic pressures which have resulted in continuous conflict in the developing world. This trend has been exacerbated by the fact that these regional conflicts have developed within the larger context of East-West struggle of the Cold War. The Soviet Union and its surrogates have acted to foment this regional strife in order to increase their regional influence. Therefore, the West in general and the U.S. in particular possess a distinct interest in controlling the spread and the intensity of these conflicts.

These actions have combined to produce a broad spectrum of warfare and pervasive challenges to the interests of the United States. Accordingly, a great number of U.S. military actions since World War II have been in reaction to the perceived threats to our interests posed by regional conflict. Our actions in response have served as vivid examples of the Clausewitzian proposition of the inextricable link of military actions to political goals. The forces in these operations serve as the military means to reach the political end.



In the conduct of these actions the manifestation of this relationship has been the emergence of political management of the military operation. The military commander's freedom of action has been restrained by direct civilian political control and the goals of the operations have been defined by diplomatic, vice military, objectives.

These developments have forced the U.S. Army to develop doctrine in response to this type of warfare which the Army has officially termed "Low Intensity Conflict (LIC). Current LIC doctrine (FM 100-20) outlines two types of operations -- Peacekeeping and Peacemaking -- designed to contain this form of warfare while supporting our political goals. These operations are defined as:

**Peacekeeping Operations:** Military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict, to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate diplomatic resolution of a conflict between belligerent.<sup>1</sup>

**Peacemaking Operations:** A type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force.<sup>2</sup>

Although current doctrine states that "peacemaking missions differ greatly in execution from peacekeeping missions"<sup>3</sup>, it implies that a strong relationship exists between the two operations. Specifically, FM

100-20 explains that while the ultimate objective of both missions "may be to maintain peace, the initial phase of peacemaking is to achieve it."<sup>4</sup> This relationship is further highlighted by the assertion that peacemaking operations are best concluded by either prompt withdrawal or by "rapid transition to a peacekeeping operation."<sup>5</sup> It is this doctrinal relationship between peacemaking and peacekeeping operations and the assertion that a peacemaking force can successfully transition to peacekeeping operations that will be the subject of this analysis.

Specifically, this study will focus on the differences in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations through the analysis of each in the moral, physical and cybernetic domains. U.N. Peacekeeping and the Multinational Forces and Observers (MFO) will serve as the models for peacekeeping analysis. And United States actions in the Dominican Republic in 1965, in Lebanon in 1958, and in Beirut from 1982 to 1984 will serve as the basis for the analysis of peacemaking operations. The purpose of this study is to analyze the doctrinal relationship between peacemaking and peacekeeping and to assess the implications of these missions to the tactical commander. The study will conclude with an assessment of the compatibility of the two operations and the likelihood of successfully transitioning from one mission to the other.

## II THE NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS

### The Framework

The analytical framework of the three domains of warfare -- moral, physical and cybernetic -- will be used to analyze peacekeeping and peacemaking operations for the purpose of determining the true nature of both operations.

The moral domain of conflict encompasses those factors that contribute to either the disintegration or, conversely, the maintenance of will within a unit. Some of the factors in this domain are: the skill of the commander, morale, motivation, cohesion, discipline, training, stress, and leadership.

The physical domain of conflict encompasses those factors that contribute to either the destruction or the material sustainment or maintenance of a unit. Some of the key factors of the physical domain are the use of: technology, terrain, logistics, and weapons.

The cybernetic domain of conflict encompasses those factors that are concerned with the processes of a unit that contribute to its cohesion. Some of the important factors in this domain are: organization, information, communications, command and control and the coordination (liaison) process of a unit.

## Peacekeeping

### Moral Domain of Peacekeeping

The moral domain of peacekeeping is the first area to be analyzed. The first and most obvious characteristic of this type operation is the firm policy of the non-use of force. Force is only to be used by MFO and U.N. peacekeepers in the event of physical attack and then only as a last resort. "A peacekeeping soldier may use his weapon only in defense of his life or in conjunction with his fellow soldiers to defend UN positions and/or property against attack."<sup>7</sup> MFO forces operate under similar Rules Of Engagement (ROE) which also stipulate that force is to be used only when life is threatened, and then, only the the minimum force necessary will be used with firearms serving as a last resort.

There have been exceptions to this rule by U.N. forces (most notably during the operation in the Congo from 1961-64); however, the use of force usually results in negative political consequences. A key characteristic of the ROE for U.N. and MFO peacekeepers is the fact that the ROE are fixed and consistent throughout the force. Each force member is required to be absolutely familiar with the specifics and the intent of these rules prior to operating in the field.

The reluctance to use force is based on the fact that "it is generally conceded that the resort to force spells the end of effective peacekeeping."<sup>8</sup> This principle of the non-use of force is a feature that is unique to peacekeeping operations.

The most enduring principle of peacekeeping operations and one directly related to the non-use of force is the requirement for the force to maintain absolute neutrality and impartiality "a quality that normally is considered an absolute essential prerequisite for participation in a peacekeeping force".<sup>9</sup> Total objectivity to both parties to the dispute and the issues at stake is the goal. This climate of neutrality is designed to create or enhance an atmosphere in which the final resolution of the dispute can be achieved through peaceful, diplomatic means. Fundamental to the success of these operations is the perception of the peacekeeping force as an interim force concerned only with resolving the dispute on its merits to the satisfaction of the concerned parties. From this perceived neutrality the credibility of the force and its acceptance by the disputants is developed.

Accordingly, a viable peacekeeping force requires the acceptance, consent and loyalty of all parties to

the dispute. This is critical for the force must enjoy freedom of movement and communication, be granted certain privileges and immunities and receive logistical support and cooperation. The MFO, for example, enjoys complete and unlimited movement through its zone of operation and expeditious movement between Israel and Egypt. Its members are immune from criminal and civil jurisdiction of the host State, taxation, and customs and import duty fees. Water and fuel are provided by Egypt while all fresh foodstuffs are purchased from Israel.

This consent and loyalty is absolutely critical for:

"The nature of the relationship such a peacekeeping force achieves with the population within its area of control is a decisive element determining the operation's success or failure. In brief, a relationship to local civilians predicated on consensus, communication and confidence is necessary for success. A relationship characterized by mounting hostility, suspicion and the lack of communication is a sufficient cause for failure."<sup>10</sup>

So, in the moral sphere the interdependent principles of the non-use of force, neutrality, and universal acceptance are vital.

Another factor within the moral domain of peacekeeping operations is the unique kind of stress associated with this operation. During the monotonous duties of successful peacekeeping, boredom and

frustration are the major problems suffered by soldiers. The repetitious nature of uneventful patrol activities, checkpoint duties and the daily execution of observing, reporting and verifying provide little excitement and variety. This is compounded since the soldier must adjust to a totally different form of soldiering than he is used to. The type of soldier -- elite, combat-ready -- that is usually assigned to U.N and MFO peacekeeping duties, is confronted with the incongruity of performing a mission with characteristics -- non-use of force, nonaggressive behavior -- which differ greatly from those he would experience in combat.

Related to the unique stresses created by peacekeeping duties is the clear fact that soldiers participating in these operations require significant attitudinal adjustment. For soldiers trained in the use of force as their primary means of surviving and accomplishing their mission in combat, this mission requires a fundamentally different psychological approach. Restraint, tact, diplomacy, patience, and endurance are the tools of the peacekeeper. This attitude is diametrically opposed to the aggressive attitude that has been inculcated into soldiers in preparing them for conventional combat missions. The tactical commander preparing for or participating in

peacekeeping duties must recognize this significant difference and construct his force's attitude accordingly.

Finally, these unconventional characteristics in the moral domain of peacekeeping obviously call for a uniquely skilled commander. The commander of a peacekeeping unit faces unique challenges requiring special skills. First, he must face the challenge of double loyalty. He will naturally retain his normal loyalty to his country, his branch of service and his parent unit. However, he also must exhibit an equal and perhaps dominant loyalty to the peacekeeping force headquarters. Due to the sensitivity of the mission, the commander must be able to amicably resolve all issues and, therefore, "a disposition to compromise and a disinclination to rock the boat are essential qualities".<sup>11</sup>

Obviously, the commander needs a deep understanding and sensitivity to the history, and present condition of the dispute. This requires a political, historical, social, and cultural depth of understanding not usually demanded of commanders in other situations. Also, since this is a "diplomatic colony, both socially and operationally"<sup>12</sup> the commander must possess an understanding of the



diplomatic process and the attendant protocol requirements.

Likewise, the commander must understand the perspective of his peacekeeping counterparts. For a harmonious relationship with his fellow peacekeepers is essential for professional execution of the mission. The ability to compromise and the display of patience are required skills.

#### Physical Domain of Peacekeeping

The physical domain of peacekeeping operations is also unique. One area in which it is different from other military missions is the application of technology. The technology that is most valuable to the peacekeeping force is that which enhances their ability to peacefully conduct surveillance, communicate, report and process information. Technology in peacekeeping operations is used for one of three purposes; first, to improve the accuracy of reporting; second, to reduce misinterpretation thereby increasing confidence in the force's competence; and, third, to contribute to crisis management.<sup>13</sup>

However, the introduction of improved technology into a region is limited by considerations that do not usually affect other tactical missions. Political acceptability by the host State (based on perceived infringement of autonomy and sovereignty), and the

perception of intrusive intelligence gathering exceeding purely peacekeeping requirements for surveillance are two of the most obvious constraints. For example, Egypt forbids, out of political sensitivity, the deployment of TOW and DRAGON night sights to the Sinai although these night vision devices would greatly enhance the MFO's night surveillance capabilities.

In summary, the use of technology in peacekeeping operations is directed towards improving the ability of the forces to peacefully execute their mission. But, introduction of advanced technology into the region is governed primarily by political considerations.

While terrain analysis in conventional operations relies on OCOKA as the framework for analysis, terrain analysis in peacekeeping operations centers on the mission of the force and the nature of the dispute. First, the mission of the force provides the basic orientation on the terrain. Since most peacekeeping forces are interpositionary forces with responsibility for a specific zone, mission analysis will dictate operational use of the terrain. For example, the mission for the U.S. Battalion of the MFO specifies responsibility for observing, and reporting violations to the freedom of navigation in the strait of Tiran (at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba). Therefore,

observation posts must be positioned to observe the Strait.

From an analysis of the nature of the dispute, locations of disputed areas, traditional invasion routes/avenues of approach, heavily travelled areas, and points of entry/exit to the zones of responsibility are "key" terrain. This criteria for terrain analysis dictates the location of observation posts, check points, patrols, and contingency plans.

The logistics of peacekeeping forces are primarily concerned with providing life support first, and mission support second. The multinational nature characteristic of a peacekeeping force has considerably complicated logistical support in the past. The U.N. and MFO have found that it is more economical and efficient to centralize the logistical support in one national contingent. Accordingly, logistical support in the MFO is provided by the U.S. Logistical Support Unit. This centralized support requires the standardization of equipment throughout the force.

Since peacekeeping operations are usually conducted in austere, inhospitable environments, the most basic life support requirements -- potable water, fresh food, billeting needs -- have to be forecast and intensely managed. Ammunition requirements, after the establishment of an initial basic load, are usually

restricted to the small arms needs necessary for self-defense as opposed to the greater needs presented by combat operations. Therefore, the special needs of a peacekeeping force present logistical challenges that are quite dissimilar to those of standard military operations.

#### Cybernetic Domain of Peacekeeping

Essential to peacekeeping operations is a clear mandate which "is the sole authority under which the force can operate."<sup>14</sup> From this broad guidance the mission is developed. As no standard situation exists for peacekeeping operations, there can be no standard mandate and mission. However, it is a principle that the mission must be translated from those somewhat nebulous policy goals into a militarily precise definition of the duties, responsibilities, and limitations of the force.

As in other military operations once the mission is defined the next step is to establish the task organization. Specifically, what should be the size and composition of the peacekeeping force? The accepted rule is

"that a UN peacekeeping force does not have to be stronger than any of the parties involved in the dispute but it must be of sufficient strength to stand by itself or to defend itself effectively if attacked,"<sup>15</sup>

The force composition is also determined by its mission, the nature and size of its area of operations and terrain analysis.

Traditionally, the type of U.S. ground forces most commonly found in peacekeeping operations are light infantry units from the Army or Marines. These units are usually augmented with military police, linguists and area specialists, additional medical and communications personnel, and legal advisors. The U.S. Battalion in the MFO has also been augmented with an attached aviation company to provide the mobility required to operate in that rugged terrain. In summary, the force is tailored to the specific situation and possesses limited combat power.

Intelligence in military operations is normally oriented on the capabilities of the enemy. However, since in true peacekeeping operations no enemy exists, the intelligence assets of the peacekeeping force are directed to gathering information that is directly related to the tasks of observing, reporting and verifying possible violations. Accordingly, the effort of collection and analysis is directed to identifying indications of future treaty violations or other situations that could jeopardize the peace. The UN and MFO prohibit any form of covert intelligence operations and consider the term "intelligence" an anathema.

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euphemistically referring to all intelligence as "military information". Only overt methods are authorized since the perception of "spying" by the force erodes the trust and confidence of the parties. Also, knowledge of the attitudes of the disputants and the genesis of the conflict assists in forming the intelligence picture.

Command and control (C<sup>2</sup>), the dominant cybernetic process, is fairly similar to that of most organizations with some minor considerations. The two dominant characteristics of the C<sup>2</sup> process are adherence to the principle of unity of command and a uniformly broad span of control. The multinational composition of most peacekeeping forces complicates the C<sup>2</sup> process. The language "barrier" between the commander and his national contingents will be problematic since some elements may have only a few personnel fluent in the force's official language. Within the translation and retransmission of orders the intent may be misconstrued. To reduce the inherent problems in multinational operations, the UN model stresses that the link from the force commander to his units must be direct without intermediate headquarters. This unity of command within a simplified chain of command can mitigate the procedural and language differences within the force.

While seemingly contradictory, the increased breadth of control in peacekeeping operations in reality complements the simplified command structure. In several operations (UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNFICYP), the force commander has directly controlled seven to ten national contingents and, in the case of UNEF II, ten battalions. In conventional military operations a similar span of control would be considered excessive.

"However, as peacekeeping operations are far less intensive than war, the span of control principle does not outweigh the potential for confusion in orders which intermediate or satellite headquarters can cause."<sup>16</sup>

Therefore, while the span of control may be exceptionally broad, that breadth can simplify the C<sup>2</sup> process and complements the principle of unity of command.

Related to the information process is the necessity in peacekeeping operations of liaison with the disputants. This liaison is the vital, daily, face-to-face link between the parties to the dispute. And it serves as the mediatory communications system with the goal of easing tensions and conflict resolution. This process builds upon the moral bonds of trust and confidence that the parties place in the force. The U.S. Battalion of the MFO maintains daily contact with representatives from the Liaison System of Israel and the Liaison System of Egypt, resolving minor

irritations and disputes. Similarly, UNIFIL's successful liaison efforts with all the parties in troubled Southern Lebanon has resulted in "a general pacification of the territory under its charge".<sup>17</sup>



## Peacemaking

### Moral Domain of Peacemaking

The use of force in peacemaking operations is not as clearly defined as in peacekeeping operations. While the non-use of force is an established principle that remains fairly consistent throughout peacekeeping operations, no such fixed principle concerning the use of force exists in peacemaking operations. Past experience indicates that the ROE reflect both the perceived threat and the diplomatic concerns for the political end state. Another characteristic is the ROE are usually adjusted to the changing threat throughout the operation. For example, in the 1965 Dominican Republic intervention, while the 82d Airborne initially conducted "stability operations" -- combat operations against rebel forces while opening a corridor through the city of Santo Domingo -- these forces used appropriate force.

"Prohibitions on the use of artillery, tanks, and mortars prevented a conflagration in the congested tinderbox of Santo Domingo. Thus, few disputed the necessity of this restriction. The order not to fire unless fired on, while not so readily embraced, still fell within the realm of the necessary, especially during the early period of the intervention when an aggressive spirit, imperfect fire discipline, a belief in a military solution, and as instinctive fear of unknown dangers could have led to needless killing and, consequently, diplomatic complications."<sup>18</sup>

Following the reduction of rebel strongholds, in the subsequent cease-fire phase, the use of force was modified.

"Late in May, General Palmer directed a change to the rules of engagement. The soldier, who had previously been allowed to 'return fire when fired upon,' was required to take cover and not fire unless the position was in danger of being overrun or American lives were in extreme danger".<sup>19</sup>

Similarly, in Lebanon in 1958 the forces initially expected combat operations and operated under appropriate ROE. After the restoration of peace to the city of Beirut, the use of force became more restrictive. To avoid an overreaction that could result in renewed fighting, the ROE was changed restricting the soldiers from returning fire "unless they had a clear target".<sup>20</sup> This was a more restrictive ROE, but not as restraining as in the Dominican Republic.

However, peacemaking forces have not always been as adept at analyzing the changing situation and adjusting the ROE accordingly. The most dramatic example of this occurred with the Marines in the MNF (Multinational Force) in Beirut in 1983. Initially, When the Marines entered Beirut in 1982 the rules of engagement were fairly liberal, allowing the Marines to fire first, and consisted of three elements:

"the first was self-defense; the second and third elements involved the force commander's judgment. If hostile intent was demonstrated, the Marines could fire pre-

emotively. If the situation turned hostile, the commander should be prepared to withdraw his forces."<sup>21</sup>

Complicating the use of force issue was the fact that starting in May 1983 the Marines simultaneously employed two sets of ROE. One, the "blue card", specified the ROE in the vicinity of the embassy and the ambassador's residence. It emphasized tighter security and more flexible use of force. The other, the "white card", established a different ROE in the vicinity of the Marine's airport compound of less stringent security. However, this double standard was not the fatal flaw in the use of force policy. The fatal flaw was that unlike the peacemaking forces in Beirut in 1958 and in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the Marines of the MNF failed to modify their ROE as the threat and the situation changed. The initial ROE were appropriate as long as the force acted as an impartial force and not as a party to the internecine power struggle. However, in September 1983 the use of combat power in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces escalated to the commitment of air and naval gunfire against Islamic militia groups and irrevocably cast the Marines as "instruments engaged in enforcing the will of a party to the civil war".<sup>22</sup> This perception of the Marines as a partisan force made them a target for the Moslem factions and ultimately contributed to the disaster in October, 1983.

Therefore, the use of force in peacemaking operations can be characterized as being established to meet the perceived threat, supported by overwhelming combat power, and tempered by the diplomatic desire to establish peace on our terms. But, the use of force in these situations permanently destroys the perceived neutrality and impartiality of the force.

Accordingly, and in sharp contrast to peacekeeping, the perception of American neutrality and impartiality is usually the first victim in our peacemaking efforts. It is a logical result of the political goals of our past interventions that if we are to influence the situation to effect our desired end state (usually defined by the government of our choice) then we wade-in to the aid of the appropriate party.

For example, in the Dominican Republic President Johnson committed the peacemaking forces ostensibly to evacuate Americans. However, "the division's (82d Airborne) arrival in the Dominican Republic displayed President Lyndon Johnson's resolve to prevent another pro-left regime from taking power in the Caribbean".<sup>23</sup> This overt support to the "loyalist" forces not only established the force as a partisan player to the struggle in the eyes of the disputants, it also angered

most of our allies in the region and reinforced the image of U.S. imperialism in the Latin America.

And, as previously discussed, our large scale retaliation with naval gunfire in Beirut had similar deleterious results.

"The MNF ceased to be viewed as a peacekeeping force the moment the American contingent engaged in large-scale retaliation with heavy bombardments resulting in substantial 'collateral damage' to civilians".<sup>24</sup>

Therefore, past peacemaking forces have violated the perception of neutrality in the eyes of the parties to the disputes. And by the nature of their operation have clearly established themselves as partial actors to the dispute.

The area of local consent and approval in peacemaking operations is fundamentally different than that existing in peacekeeping operations. Peacemaking forces, due to their partisan mission, operate with the consent of only one of the disputants. In the Dominican Republic it was the "loyalist" junta, while in Beirut in both 1958 and 1982, the force operated with the consent of the besieged Lebanese government. The unfortunate but unavoidable result of this universal lack of acceptance is that the opposition treats the force as the enemy. In the case of MNF II in Beirut, the result was catastrophic since "the factions that opposed the government employed any means

available, including terrorism, to drive the MNF out of the country".<sup>25</sup>

Another factor in the moral domain that is different from both conventional and peacekeeping operations is the stress related to peacemaking operations. Stress is usually caused by the reality of the situation not matching the expectation of the soldier. The soldiers deployed on these operations were the elite of the U.S. Armed Forces, usually the Marines and the 82d Airborne Division. These soldiers had been prepared for combat operations of a conventional nature -- clearly defined enemy, freedom of action from overt political control, a clear end state defined in military terms, and relative freedom in the use of force. What they discovered, of course, was a totally different ballgame. In the 1958 Lebanon operation, for example, the frustration was obvious

"As they later wrote in their reports, staff officers understood that the military character of the intervention had come to depend upon the peculiarities of Lebanese politics. Every now and then, a note of disappointment creeps into these reports: what promised to be a military operation had suddenly become too political."<sup>26</sup>

This frustration and disappointment permeates the force from rifleman to senior officer and is characteristic in most operations of this type. This disillusionment was also present in the Dominican Republic. "soldiers cursed the

restrictions and wondered why the military had not better trained them for political-military operations".<sup>27</sup>

Another stress associated with peacemaking operations is that of boredom. After initial combat, if any, the pervasive boring nature of this duty is occasionally punctuated by sporadic sniper fire or small arms exchanges as diplomats attempt to negotiate a final solution.

Obviously, soldiers participating in peacemaking operations require attitudinal retraining to prepare for this unique mission and to better cope with the aforementioned stresses. The required shift in attitude may not be as drastic as evidenced in peacekeeping operations. But, the more ambiguous situation characteristic of peacemaking operations poses a tougher challenge in preparing the force's attitude. Past operations clearly indicate several key points in this area. First, most soldiers participating in these operations assume that it will be the conventional military operation for which he is trained. And if this standard simplistic preconception of the nature of the operation is allowed to continue, soldiers will be frustrated and confused. Hence, the soldier must understand

the reality of the nature of peacemaking. Second, he must understand that this is an operation that is governed by diplomatic objectives. Therefore, a standard military solution is impossible and he will be operating under changing restraints on his use of force.

As in all military operations the skill of the commander is a key ingredient. In peacemaking operations the skills required are certainly unique. First and foremost the commander must understand the delicate task of carefully orchestrating military operations to support political goals. Second operating in a true "fog of war" with ill-defined boundaries, unconventional enemies and unclear threat requires the commander to demonstrate great operational flexibility. As the mission and general situation change, the tactical commander must demonstrate great mental agility by changing his operating procedures and the use of force accordingly. Correspondingly, the commander must realize that restraint is absolutely vital. The use of demonstrations, shows of force, and feints contribute more to the long term success of the mission than does the indiscriminate use of force. Bruce Palmer's adept leadership in the Dominican



Republic stands as a sterling example of the skilled commander in peacemaking operations. Conversely, as the Long Commission Report indicates, the leadership of the Marines in Beirut in 1983, failed to demonstrate these necessary attributes of the skilled commander.

#### Physical Domain of Peacemaking

The force composition of past peacemaking operations indicate several distinct characteristics. The first is that the U.S. has always deployed overwhelming combat power in support of peacemaking operations. At the height of the Dominican Republic operation and within thirty days of the start of the intervention, the U.S. troop strength on the island reached its height of 24000. Also in support of this formidable force were two fighter and one reconnaissance squadrons in Puerto Rico and another Airborne Division standing-by in the United States. Similarly in Lebanon in 1958 the Marine Commander, BG David Gray, tried to prevent a Medium Tank Battalion from landing since

"clearly there was a limit to how much American force needed to be put ashore in Lebanon, and General Gray thought that the command had reached the saturation point by 22 July...There was no question whatever that by the end of July there was more than enough American military force on hand to meet any threat, however constituted."<sup>28</sup>

BG Gray was also concerned about the planned deployment of an Honest John Battery since it was "a weapon that I could not visualize needing."<sup>29</sup>

Similarly, the Marines in Lebanon in 1983 also deployed with a sizable force. The 24th Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and supporting aviation, artillery, logistical, and Army (Target acquisition radar) units brought the strength of the contingent to 1600. However, the difference between the Americans and the other contingents was the formidable supporting firepower at sea. "The Americans fairly quickly assembled about 20 ships, a force out of proportion to the task at hand."<sup>30</sup>

So, the characteristics of American peacemaking forces are that they are overstrength for the scope of the operation, and the firepower available is disproportionate to the threat. For in an atmosphere of restraint and restricted use of force, Honest John Batteries, tank battalions and battleships are inappropriate weapons against the irregular forces that we usually oppose in these operations.

Briefly, the key terrain to peacekeeping forces is different than most military operations. Since most of our peacemaking operations have centered on fighting irregular forces in urban terrain (Santo Domingo, Beirut), the forces had to rapidly make the adjustment

from "high ground and critical terrain to key buildings and objectives".<sup>31</sup> Possession of key facilities -- powerplant, communications, industrial, financial, civic, and health -- become those "key buildings and objectives". Also, the location of possibly endangered American civilians is important since they may have to be protected, evacuated or rescued. Finally, since the prevalent threat is from the ubiquitous sniper and the surprise terrorist attack, terrain features which afford the greatest protection from these threats are important.

The initial planning and force structure in peacekeeping is tailored to support combat operations. Therefore, logistics and the use of technology in support of peacemaking forces is similar to combat operations..

#### Cybernetic Domain of Peacemaking

The establishment of the mission for peacemaking forces has been problematic. First, a clear mission statement stated in precise, well-defined, military terms is usually not provided to the tactical commander. Uncertainty over the tactical situation and the desired role of the military force contribute to this problem. This has been a chronic failure in peacemaking operations. In the Dominican Republic

operation "critics have faulted U.S. political authorities for not understanding or paying attention to the military's requirement for a clear mission statement".<sup>32</sup> Also, in Lebanon in 1958, the Commander of American Land Forces encountered a similar problem "General Adams's first priority was to translate the broad mission directive into an operational mission statement".<sup>33</sup>

Unfortunately, the same problem was experienced in Beirut in 1983. The mission statement for the Marine force passed essentially unchanged from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Task Force Commander.<sup>34</sup> This militarily inexact and imprecise mission statement created perception problems throughout the chain of command. This was critical, a House Committee investigation reported,

"Marine leaders interpreted the political/diplomatic nature of the mission as requiring a high priority on visibility and emphasized that to the extent of allowing greater than necessary security risks."<sup>35</sup>

This incident underscores the critical requirement in peacemaking operations of the establishment of a proper mission for the force. For the unclear mission statement and the variations of its meaning and intent contributed to the excessive use of force and the vulnerability of the Marine headquarters to attack.

Another key characteristic of the mission is its changing nature. The skilled commander must possess

that innate feel for the situation, Clausewitz's *coup d'oeil*, and quickly assess the situation and adjust the unit's mission accordingly. Bruce Palmer, in the Dominican Republic, successfully executed this difficult task.

"At each stage of the intervention, General Palmer was called upon to perform different missions, each tailored to support changing diplomatic initiatives. To accomplish these, Palmer modified his rules of engagement frequently...By providing American diplomats with this type of flexible support (Palmer) stopped the bloodshed and helped promote a negotiated settlement in the Dominican Republic"-36

Unfortunately, as the Long Commission states, the Marines in Beirut failed to adjust their mission to reflect the drastically changed situation. For as mentioned, their use of the excessive force of the naval gunfire removed any pretense of neutrality and impartiality from their operation. They were clearly partial actors and "if the U.S. was an ally to one force, it was an enemy to the other. The mission...should have been changed accordingly"-37

The area of intelligence is critical in these operations. As noted, force commanders must adjust their mission, operating methods and ROE as they perceive a change in the situation. Clearly, the ability to decide when to make these changes is predicated on accurate and timely intelligence. Peacemaking operations have been characterized by

vague, ambiguous situations and forces intervening in these operations have had to operate in an intelligence vacuum. This is a problem that is consistently demonstrated in all past peacemaking operations. The forces deployed in Lebanon in 1958, had difficulty understanding the military situation confronting them because "intelligence available before the operation began was either poor or nonexistent".<sup>38</sup> Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, once the troops were deployed, "they knew little about the situation. In part, their ignorance resulted from a dearth of accurate information".<sup>39</sup> And finally, the Marines of the MNF in Beirut paid the most extreme price for operating in the intelligence void. For the force commander "was not provided with timely intelligence tailored to his specific operational needs to defend against the broad spectrum of threats he faced".<sup>40</sup>

The rise in the use of terrorist activity as a weapon against U.S. forces exacerbates this intelligence shortfall. Tactical units committed to these operations are not equipped or prepared for detecting terrorist indicators. For the Marines in the MNF,

"The MAU did not receive adequate intelligence support dealing with terrorism. Serious intelligence inadequacies had a direct affect on the capability of the unit to defend itself."<sup>41</sup>

Also, the fact that these operations are controlled by political constraints with a diplomatic end state complicates the intelligence process. Specifically, the diplomatic intelligence requirements are greatly different from the military intelligence requirements. These competing requirements produce conflicting demands and a confusing intelligence product since "intelligence relevant to one mission may be irrelevant to or produce negative effect on the other".<sup>42</sup>

Therefore, the intelligence of value to the peacemaking force can be placed into two categories: military and political intelligence. Military intelligence requirements conform to conventional operational requirements: the numbers, leaders, armaments, deployments, organization, tactics, and equipment of the enemy. While political intelligence requires unique information: location of endangered Americans for possible evacuation; possibility and type of terrorist attack; assessment of "loyal" or friendly factions, strength of the government and its ability to influence the situation; and biographical information on key players - government, rebel/enemy, etc.. Required augmentation to support these intelligence needs are: increased, specially trained analysts; additional HUMINT support; terrorism specialists; and the establishment of an all-source

fusion center that would direct, and tailor all-source intelligence support to the commander.<sup>43</sup>

Intelligence is an area of critical importance to peacemaking forces presenting unique challenges. The problems that this shortfall created were luckily avoided in the Dominican Republic and Lebanon in 1958. However, the intelligence failure in Beirut had tragic consequences in October 1983 which underscore its unique nature and important role in peacemaking operations.

As the analysis of the domains of peacemaking indicate, the command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) of this operation presents unique challenges. First, operating in a true "fog of war", the C<sup>2</sup> process must rapidly acquire relevant political and military intelligence pertinent to the ambiguous situation. Second, the mission must be gleaned and refined and placed in precise military terms. Third, an appropriate policy on the use of force must be determined, standardized and disseminated. And, overall, the C<sup>2</sup> process must be oriented on continuous assessment of the situation with the purpose of appropriately changing the mission, ROE, and operating procedure accordingly.

Therefore, the C<sup>2</sup> process must exhibit great agility and political sensitivity. And it must ensure



the actions of the force support and remain focused on the diplomatic end state.

### III SUMMARY

From the analysis of the domains of peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, it is obvious that they are two greatly different operations. The most critical and most fundamental differences are in the moral and cybernetic domains.

The analysis of the moral domain of peacekeeping reveals three critical and interdependent principles. These principles form the pillars on which the legitimacy of the force is established. The first is the established principle of the non-use of force. This is key since "the effectiveness of a peacekeeping operation is often inversely related to the amount of force it employs".<sup>44</sup> Once the peacekeeping force resorts to the use of force, it has violated the second principle of neutrality. This also is vital for the legitimacy of the force since "the effectiveness of a given peacekeeping mission depends critically on its reputation for impartiality".<sup>45</sup> If this reputation is sullied and the perception of neutrality is shattered, the force ceases to be a true peacekeeping force. Unfortunately, as the MNF in Beirut demonstrated, once this reputation of neutrality is surrendered it is irredeemable. The third principle of peacekeeping in the moral domain is the requirement for the consent and loyalty of all the disputants to the peacekeeping force. This acceptance is based on the perceived

neutrality of the force. A lack of acceptance of the peacekeeping force is a cause for failure of the mission.

The moral domain of peacemaking is diametrically opposed to that of peacekeeping. Not only are the three inviolate principles of peacekeeping not applicable to peacemaking, but peacemaking operations possess opposite characteristics. Peacemaking operations are partisan interventions on behalf of the peacemaker's national interests. Therefore the perception of neutrality vanishes the minute the first soldier wades ashore in Beirut or lands in Santo Domingo. Restraint and the non-use of force give way to the commitment of all available combat power necessary to seize a military objective or to defeat or retaliate against an "enemy" force. Obviously, in this atmosphere, universal consent and loyalty of all the parties to the dispute is impossible.

The cybernetic domains of peacekeeping and peacemaking are also completely different. The criteria for task organization and the orientation of the C<sup>2</sup> and intelligence processes are fundamentally dissimilar. First, peacekeeping forces are tailored to fulfill their specific mission. The amount of combat power is limited since the orientation is on the maintenance of the truce as opposed to the conduct of combat operations. In peacemaking operations, the

force is organized with overwhelming combat power based on expected combat operations of unknown duration and intensity. Even if the force does not use its tremendous combat power, it maintains weapons -- Honest John Batteries, Battleship Task Forces, close air support aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery -- that are clearly inappropriate to peacekeeping operations.

The intelligence (military information) and C<sup>2</sup> processes of peacekeeping are oriented on the actions of the disputants vis a vis each other. Predicting, observing, reporting, analyzing, and verifying actions of the parties in relation to the truce and the other party are the mission of the cybernetic process in peacekeeping. Conversely, in peacemaking the intelligence and C<sup>2</sup> processes are oriented in a more conventional manner on the actions of the disputants vis a vis the peacemaking force. Analyzing the military and political intelligence, within the dense fog of war present in these ambiguous and unclear situations, is the role of the intelligence process. Similarly, the C<sup>2</sup> process is oriented on overcoming the friction present in combat operations and deciding when alteration to the mission, ROE and operating procedures is warranted.

While it is established that peacemaking and peacekeeping are vastly different operations, a greater doctrinal question needs to be addressed. Are the

missions incompatible? Specifically, can a peacemaking force be expected to transition to peacekeeping operations as our doctrine states?

The analysis of the two operations indicate that the differences in the moral, physical and cybernetic domains of the two operations are so fundamental that it is dangerous to expect a tactical commander to successfully transition from peacemaking to peacekeeping.

The experience of the Marines in Beirut from 1982 to 1984 indicates that a peacemaking force cannot act as a peacekeeping force. For once a force establishes itself as a partisan peacemaking force it cannot transition to peacekeeping without great risk of failure. As the Beirut operation indicates, once a force violates the moral principles of peacekeeping, it cannot function as a legitimate peacekeeping force.

#### IV CONCLUSION

"No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses should do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it".<sup>46</sup>

The warning of Clausewitz of the need to clearly establish the political purpose and military operational concept prior to war certainly applies to the realm of Low Intensity Conflict.

Clearly, if the situation and our political goals indicate the need to use force to establish or restore peace, then a peacemaking operation is warranted. However, if the diplomatic goal and the situation are appropriate to military operations without the use of force to maintain a negotiated truce or peace then a peacekeeping operation is required. Far too often we have committed forces to peacemaking operations and have expected them to transition from this hostile environment to peacekeeping operation. We have been successful when confronting a weak, fragmented, and poorly organized enemy as in 1965 and 1958. However, when we confronted a hostile, ideologically determined and organized enemy as in Beirut in 1983, our peacemaking/peacekeeping force met disaster.

Since the moral, physical, and cybernetic functions of the two operations are so incompatible, it could be disastrous to expect a tactical commander to

successfully transition from peacemaking to  
peackeeeping.

## VI ENDNOTES

Many of the comments on the MFO are based on the author's experience as a member of that force from 18 November 1986 to 18 May 1987 as the Operations Officer of the U.S. Task Force.

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